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Abstract
We examine the effect of an increase in aviation fuel tax on reductions in fuel 
consumption and carbon emissions using data from the US airline industry. The results 
of simultaneous quantile regression using an unbalanced annual panel of US carriers 
from 1995 to 2013 suggest that the short-run price elasticities of jet fuel consumption, 
which are negative and statistically significant for all quantiles, vary from -0.350 to -
0.166. The long-run price elasticities show a similar pattern and vary from -0.346 to -
20.166. However, they are statistically significant only for the 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 
quantiles. The results suggest that the amount of the reduction of fuel consumption and 
CO2 emissions would be smaller in the longer term. Our calculation, using values from 
2012, suggests that an increase in aviation fuel tax of 4.3 cents, which was the highest 
increase in aviation fuel tax in the US during the analysis period, would reduce CO2 
emissions in the US by approximately 0.14 percent to 0.18 percent in the short run (1 
year after the tax increase). However, perhaps due to the rebound effect, the percentage 
reduction in CO2 emissions would decrease to about 0.008 percent to 0.01 percent in the 
long run (3 years after the tax increase).
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31 Background
The aviation sector’s contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has 
been relatively small, with a 2010 share of approximately 2.02 percent of total CO2 
emissions worldwide (calculation based on European Union Global Emissions EDGAR 
v4.2 FT2010). According to our calculation based on the 2012 data of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), US carriers’ domestic flights account for 
about 2.3 percent of CO2 emissions in the US. Even if we include international flights, 
US carriers accounted for only about 3.5 percent of CO2 emissions in the US in the 
same year.
However, despite advances in technology, which have improved the fuel efficiency 
of aircraft significantly over the past 20 years, the amount and proportion of CO2 
emissions from the aviation sector have been increasing steadily in the US. The solid 
line in Figure 1 shows that the fuel consumption per mile flown by US carriers dropped 
from approximately 3.7 gallons in January 1990 to around 2.3 gallons in December 
2013, which suggests a remarkable improvement in fuel efficiency. Although more 
frequent flights with smaller aircraft may have contributed to increased fuel 
consumption per mile flown, increased average stage lengths may have contributed to 
lower fuel consumption per mile flown. On the other hand, the dotted line in Figure 1 
suggests that the total fuel consumption by US carriers has not decreased as 
dramatically as the fuel consumption per mile flown. This may be because the 
significant growth in air transport demand in the US, which is shown in Figure 2, has 
outpaced the fuel efficiency gains. As shown in Figure 3, the annual total CO2 
emissions in the US have decreased since 2007, and those in 2012 (5024.7 MMTCO2) 
were virtually at the same level of 1995 (5041.2 MMTCO2). In contrast, as Figure 4 
4shows, the annual CO2 emissions from commercial flights by US carriers have 
increased steadily for the past 20 years, and those in 2012 (174.7 MMTCO2) reached 
around 9.5 percent above the 1995 level (159.6 MMTCO2). Again, this is mainly due to 
the ever-growing demand for international air travel, which has resulted in significant 
increases in fuel consumption, offsetting fuel efficiency improvements. Consequently, 
the proportion of CO2 emissions from the aviation sector in the US has been rising 
steadily, as depicted by the bold solid line in Figure 4. The amount of CO2 emissions 
from the aviation sector remains small compared to the total amount of CO2 emissions 
(approximately 3.5 percent of total emissions in 2012). However, in light of the strong 
demand for international air travel and the expected increase in demand, CO2 emissions 
from the aviation sector are likely to increase rapidly without concerted efforts by 
policymakers and the industry to reduce emissions (see Mayor and Tol, 2010; Owen et 
al., 2010; Preston et al., 2012).
[Figure 1: Fuel consumption per mile flown by US carriers]
[Figure 2: Monthly total miles flown by US carriers]
[Figure 3: Annual total CO2 emissions in the US]
[Figure 4: Annual CO2 emissions from commercial flights in the US]
For the past decade, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and its 
member states have been working with the aviation industry to address CO2 emissions 
from international aviation by developing a global scheme for this sector. However, the 
aviation sector has not yet been fully subject to any greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations, 
perhaps only except for those of the European Union (EU). The EU launched its 
5Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005. Since the beginning of 2012, the system 
has covered the CO2 emissions produced by aviation activity, including all flights 
within the EU and between countries participating in the EU ETS (European 
Commission (EC), 2006; EC, 2009). Later, in 2013, EC directives regarding the EU 
ETS were amended to include aviation activities within the scheme for GHG emission 
allowance trading by 2020, although the scheme only covers activities within the EU 
(EU, 2014). The ICAO is expected to establish a global market-based measure (MBM) 
in 2016.
In terms of reducing the amount of CO2 emissions, the cap-and-trade system and 
fuel tax are closely related but are different policy measures. A cap-and-trade system 
constrains aggregate emissions first by setting the cap on overall emissions levels and 
creating a monetary value of emissions for trading and then by allocating a limited 
number of free emission allowances. In contrast, when employing a fuel tax, it is 
impossible to determine the amount of the reductions in CO2 emissions in advance. 
Thus, the concept of a cap-and-trade system is becoming widely accepted as a more 
appropriate and efficient approach to achieving environmental objectives and targets 
than a fuel tax.
However, if the market carbon price drops too low, the incentives to reduce 
emissions will also be reduced. In fact, as of 2014, the EU ETS “faces a challenge in the 
form of a growing surplus of allowances [of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and 
European Union Allowances (EUA)], largely because of the economic crisis which has 
depressed emissions more than anticipated” since 2009 (EC, 2014a). According to the 
EC, the surplus stood at almost two billion in allowances in early 2012 and had grown 
further to over 2.1 billion by the end of 2013. Moreover, the EC noted that “While the 
6rapid build-up is expected to end from 2014, it is not anticipated that the overall surplus 
will decline significantly” (EC, 2014b). In the longer term, this could negatively affect 
the ability of the EU ETS to reduce emissions. A critically important element is the 
establishment of a market-determined price for EU allowances (Miyoshi, 2014). The 
EU ETS system designed in 2012 will not produce substantial emission reductions from 
air transport (Vespermann and Wald, 2011) due to the current low price of carbon in the 
market. To make the scheme effective, the carbon price needs to be high (Derigs and 
Illing, 2013; Miyoshi, 2014; Sgouridis et al., 2011; Vespermann and Wald, 2011).
MBMs such as the EU ETS can be cost effective. However, in some particular 
circumstances, their effects will be limited, and combining them with other economic 
instruments, such as fuel tax, can create compatible mechanisms (Carlsson and Hammer, 
2002; Mayor and Tol, 2007). In light of these circumstances, and especially considering 
the growing contribution of the aviation sector to global GHG emissions and the recent 
challenges of the EU ETS to control an effective carbon price, it is worthwhile to 
examine the effect of an increase in fuel tax on reductions in fuel consumption and CO2 
emissions. Even though a fuel tax cannot control the amount of CO2 emissions, it could 
be an important complementary tool in a CO2 emissions reduction policy. Therefore, 
this paper aims to estimate how effective fuel tax could be as a tool to abate emissions 
from aviation activity, both domestic and international, by using historical data from the 
US for the period of 1995 to 2013.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies. 
The methodologies, models, and data are explained in Section 3. The results are 
presented and discussed in Section 4. The effects of an increase in aviation fuel tax on 
7reductions in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions are estimated in Section 5, and 
Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous studies
The role of the air transport industry has been widely discussed with regard to its 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions and contribute to addressing the climate change 
challenge. Among the important measures discussed are the economic instruments for 
reducing CO2 emissions, such as ETSs. The advantage of an ETS is that the regulator 
can set a clear target for emissions reductions by fixing the overall emissions levels. In 
addition, the tradable permit scheme increases the polluters’ choices for reducing their 
emissions and at the same time lowers the total abatement cost for achieving the target 
(Ison et al., 2002; Mendes and Santos, 2008). Carriers can use various means, such as 
technological investment, production reduction (cutting capacity), moving routes, or the 
purchase of permits (low-cost abatement carriers can sell to high-cost abatement 
carriers). In addition, tradable permits do not suffer from inflation, as they are traded at 
market price. In contrast, inflation reduces the real value of the tax. Thus, tradable 
permits can be more cost effective compared to a tax-based emissions reduction system.
However, there are several issues with tradable permits. First, the initial allocation 
is very important for the emitters (air carriers), as it uses the market share during the 
monitoring year to set the allocation rate based on the benchmark established. As a 
result, the total amount of emissions in the monitoring year increases. This is a very 
contradictory outcome, although it often happens in other sectors (Miyoshi, 2014). It 
may result, for example, from the practice of some low-cost carriers (LCCs) carrying 
freight and mail in their holds during the monitoring year to increase their allocation. 
8Second, tradable permits become a barrier to entry, which creates anticompetitive issues 
for new entrants in the market. In addition, the monitoring and implementation costs 
become a burden for carriers, as they represent additional costs, especially for small-
sized carriers.
The most crucial issue is the carbon price. This fell to 2.66 euros per metric ton on 
April 23, 2013. The current carbon market price is recovering but is still considerably 
lower (around 7 euros in November 2014) than expected (European Carbon Index 
(ECarbix)). If carbon prices remain low, emitters (air carriers) prefer to purchase carbon 
allowances over investing to reduce emissions. Sgouridis et al. (2011) estimated the 
impact of the carbon pricing scheme on carbon reduction, focusing on two scenarios: 
the real price of a metric ton of CO2 being 50 US dollars (in 2005 constant dollars) and 
200 US dollars, equivalent to an increase in the kerosene price in the range of 0.5 to 2 
US dollars per gallon. The impact on both demand and emissions is minimal in the case 
of 50 US dollars per ton of CO2 but becomes a significant reduction in the case of 200 
US dollars per ton. Therefore, the carbon price should be high to be more effective in 
reducing CO2 emissions. Other researchers, e.g., Vespermann and Wald (2011), also 
suggest that a more restrictive ETS design is necessary to reduce CO2 emissions more 
effectively. If the carbon price remains low, it is appropriate and desirable to develop 
and apply alternative complementary instruments, such as a fuel tax, in implementing 
CO2 emissions reduction policies.
Strictly speaking, fuel tax and ETSs are different (Ison et al., 2002). In fact, fuel tax 
was not originally designed for environmental purposes.1 However, it can help reduce 
1 Although systematic aviation fuel tax data are hard to obtain, Keen and Strand (2007) point out that 
several countries, such as the US and Japan, impose an aviation fuel tax on commercial air carriers. 
In Japan, the aviation fuel tax system has been established as a financial resource to develop and 
9fuel consumption and CO2 emissions (Sterner, 2007). For example, Hofer et al. (2010) 
investigated how taxing air travel emissions can affect carbon emission levels across 
multiple transport modes, using data from the US domestic market. They assumed an 
emissions-tax-driven fare increase of 2 percent and an own-price elasticity of -1.15. 
Their analysis shows that these assumptions result in an estimated demand decrease of 
approximately 2.3 percent and a decrease in carbon emissions of over 2.5 million tons 
(5.5 billion pounds) (2004 data). (However, around one third of the savings in air travel 
carbon emissions could be offset by the rise in vehicle emissions.) As Hofer et al. 
(2010) note, fuel tax can be a supplementary tool in combination with an ETS, making 
up for the deficiencies of both instruments (fuel tax and the ETS) specific to global 
MBM implementation.
There are several studies on the impact of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and 
GHG emission reductions, which include Pearce and Pearce (2000), Olsthoorn (2001), 
Mayor and Tol (2007), and Tol (2007). However, Pearce and Pearce (2000), Mayor and 
Tol (2007), and Tol (2007) do not estimate the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption. 
Indeed, Pearce and Pearce (2000) estimate the monetary value of the environmental 
externalities associated with aircraft movements and hence damage-based 
environmental taxes for aircraft. Mayor and Tol (2007) and Tol (2007) estimate the 
impact of a carbon tax on aviation fuel, but their studies are based on the simulation 
manage airports. A thirteenth of the total revenue of fuel tax has been allocated to the Airport 
Development Special Account since 1972 (Airport Development Special Account Act, Supplemental 
Provision 11). The rest goes to the Treasury. In the case of the US, the revenues from the 
international arrival/departure tax, federal aviation fuel tax, and other taxes go to the General Fund 
and are then transferred to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which covers all Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) airport facilities, equipment, development, and support for over 75 percent of 
the FAA’s operation and management (Button, 2005). Hence, those aviation fuel taxes have been 
introduced and used for developing, operating, and managing airports as one of the main financial 
resources.
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model of international tourist flows. Olsthoorn (2001) estimates the price elasticity of 
world jet fuel consumption in international commercial aviation. Unfortunately, the 
price data used in Olsthoorn (2001) is not jet fuel price but crude oil price. While crude 
oil and jet fuel prices have tended to follow a similar pattern, they are not the same thing. 
In sum, to the best of our knowledge, there are few empirical studies of elasticity of jet 
fuel consumption with respect to jet fuel price. Our contribution, therefore, is to 
estimate the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption by using US historical data of jet 
fuel price and consumption for domestic and international flights, which would reveal 
the impact of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and how effective fuel tax can be as 
a tool to abate emissions from the aviation industry.
3 Model and data2
Our basic estimation model has the following specification, commonly used in 
previous studies (Burke and Nishitateno, 2013; Davis and Kilian, 2011; Haughton and 
Sarkar, 1996; Hughes et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011; Lin and Prince, 2013; Zou et al., 
2014):
log(yit) = α + γ log(pit-1) + xtρ + δt + ci + uit (1)
The subscripts i and t represent carrier and year. The dependent variable, yit, is each 
US carrier’s annual jet fuel consumption in gallons (domestic and international), and pit-
1 is the annual average inflation-adjusted after-tax price of jet fuel per gallon (domestic 
and international) paid by each US carrier in the previous year (Unit: USD). We use 
2 Details of data sources are described in Appendix A.
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aggregated data of domestic and international flights. However, the aviation fuel tax in 
the US applies only to domestic flights (US IRS, 1999). Thus, the tax is added only to 
the price of jet fuel used for domestic flights. As we use a log-log functional form, the 
coefficient of interest, γ, shows the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption. The data are 
taken from the US Department of Transportation (DOT), Form 41 Financial Data, 
Schedule P-12(a). The aviation fuel tax data are drawn from US Internal Revenue 
Service Publication 510, as shown in Table 1.
[Table 1: Tax rates on aviation fuel in the US since 1994]
The controls, xt, include the following variables: the September 11 attacks dummy 
(equals 1 for 2001 and 2002, 0 otherwise); the annual average national unemployment 
rate (seasonally adjusted) in the US (Source: US Department of Labor (DOL), Labor 
Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey); each carrier’s annual total miles 
flown on domestic and international flights (DOT Form 41 Traffic Data, T-100 
Domestic/International Segment (All Carriers)); and the annual industry average miles 
flown per gallon, which is calculated using flight data from DOT Form 41 Traffic Data, 
T-100 Domestic/International Segment (All Carriers) and monthly fuel consumption 
data from DOT Form 41 Financial Data, Schedule P-12(a).
The September 11 attacks caused extensive flight disruption. In a sluggish economy 
with high unemployment, the demand for air travel would decrease. Thus, the expected 
signs of the coefficients are negative for the September 11 attacks dummy and the 
annual unemployment rate variable.
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The total miles flown variable represents each carrier’s total annual miles flown 
(domestic and international). A carrier’s fuel consumption increases as its total miles 
flown increases. Thus, this variable is expected to have a positive sign. The annual 
industry average miles flown per gallon is included to control for the effects of 
economies of scale and technological advances. As is clearly shown in Figure 1, the 
advances in fuel efficiency during the past 20 years have been impressive. The 
improved fuel efficiency enabled carriers to reduce fuel consumption per mile by about 
38 percent in December 2013 compared to January 1990. Long-haul flights are 
generally more fuel efficient because aircraft usually consume more fuel during takeoff 
than during cruise flight. Therefore, the fuel consumption per mile could decrease if 
carriers increase the number of long-haul flights. Put differently, the economies of scale 
achieved by large-scale operations would contribute to the reduction of the fuel 
consumption per mile. At the same time, it is the progress in technology itself that has 
made it possible for aircraft to fly longer distances. This means it is very important to 
take into account the effects of the improved fuel efficiency brought about by the 
economies of scale and the advances in aircraft technology when we estimate the price 
elasticities of jet fuel consumption. The expected sign of this variable is negative.
The aggregate time effects, δt, control for annual variations that are common across 
carriers (captured by year dummies). The fixed effect, ci, captures all unobserved, time-
constant factors (unobserved time-invariant characteristics of carriers) that affect yit. 
The error, uit, is a time-varying error, i.e., an idiosyncratic error, which represents 
unobserved factors that change over time and affect yit.
The main explanatory variable, i.e., the annual average inflation-adjusted after-tax 
price of jet fuel (per gallon) paid by each carrier, is highly likely to be correlated with 
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time-constant carrier characteristics, ci. As the DOT explains on its website, jet fuel 
prices reported to the DOT differ from producer prices (DOT, 2013). Reports to the 
DOT give the cost per gallon of fuel used by a carrier during the month, rather than the 
price charged by a producer on a single day. Thus, the jet fuel price (pit) reflects the 
contractual and storage advantages and disadvantages of each carrier, which are not 
expected to change in the short term. This suggests that the jet fuel price, pit, is 
correlated with time-constant carrier characteristics, ci. Pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression is biased and inconsistent if pit and ci are correlated. Therefore, we 
include carrier dummies in Eq. (1) to control for the carrier fixed effects, ci.
The inclusion of carrier dummies, however, does not address the issue of price 
endogeneity caused by the reverse causality: an increase in fuel consumption could lead 
to an increase in fuel price. To avoid the endogeneity problem, we use a lagged fuel 
price variable, pit-1, as a predetermined variable. We also lag pit-1 twice to estimate the 
long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption, as shown in Eq. (2). We assume that the 
error, uit, is uncorrelated with all past endogenous variables.
log(yit) = α + γ1 log(pit-1) + γ2 log(pit-2) + γ3 log(pit-3) + xtρ + δt + ci + uit (2)
An additional advantage of using the lagged fuel price variables is that it makes the 
analysis more realistic. In the short term, e.g., one to several months following the fuel 
price changes, carriers’ schedules and equipment are relatively fixed. Thus, it is usually 
difficult for carriers to change their schedules, route structures, and operating practices 
immediately after the fuel price increases. Besides, investment in new equipment and 
technology extends over several years before the investment results in fuel savings. In 
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this sense, using the lagged fuel price variables is more realistic than using the fuel price 
variable in the current year, which postulates a change in fuel price has an immediate 
and contemporaneous effect on fuel consumption.
4 Estimation results
4.1 OLS estimates from the static and distributed lag models
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the unbalanced annual panel of 114 
carriers for the period of 1995 to 2013 (See Appendix B for the list of air carriers that 
appear in our data set). Table 3 reports the results, estimating Eqs. (1) and (2) by means 
of the pooled OLS: columns 1 and 2 show the estimation results from the static model; 
columns 3 and 4 present the results from the distributed lag model. Columns 1 and 3 
report the estimates with year fixed effects, whereas columns 2 and 4 indicate the 
estimates without year fixed effects but controlling specifically for income effects. 
Columns 1 to 4 show the expected negative coefficient estimates for the lagged jet fuel 
price, pit-1. Additionally, the estimates for pit-1 from the static model shown in columns 1 
and 2 are statistically significant.
[Table 2: Descriptive statistics]
[Table 3: Estimation results from OLS]
The estimation results from the static model with year fixed effects (column 1 of 
Table 3) show that the short-run price elasticity of jet fuel consumption is -0.431. 
However, the coefficients of all the control variables except for the annual total miles 
flown variable do not have the expected signs. Although none of the coefficients with 
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wrong signs is statistically significant, the results suggest that the model is not properly 
specified. Hence, we include the US annual average of monthly per capita personal 
income in Eq. (1) instead of the year fixed effects. We tried to include both effects in 
the model, but it was impossible due to multicollinearity. Column 2 of Table 3 reports 
the results. The coefficient of pit-1 decreased to -0.414, though it is still statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficients of all the control variables show the expected 
signs, and the coefficients of the total miles flown variable and the income variable are 
statistically significant. Thus, we consider the model shown in column 2 to be more 
appropriate for our data set. The results suggest that the short-run price elasticity of jet 
fuel consumption is 0.414, i.e., a one-percent increase of jet fuel price leads to about a 
0.414-percent decrease of jet fuel consumption.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the results from the distributed lag model, which 
is intended to estimate the long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption. Again, the 
results from the model with year fixed effects, which are reported in column 3, show 
that the coefficients of all the control variables except for the annual total miles flown 
variable do not have the expected negative signs. In contrast, as shown in column 4, the 
coefficients of all the control variables show the expected signs when we include the 
income variable instead of the year fixed effects. Therefore, here also, we consider the 
latter model shown in column 4 to be more appropriate than the former model shown in 
column 3.
The estimated long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption in column 4 of Table 3 
is -0.329 (≒ -0.247 – 0.0343 – 0.0472). If the elasticity is statistically significant, it 
means that jet fuel consumption decreases by about 0.3 percent after 3 years, given a 
permanent one-percent increase in fuel price. However, none of the coefficients of pit-1 
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through pit-3 in column 4 is statistically significant. The multicollinearity between the 
lagged variables may make it difficult to estimate the effect at each lag. To obtain the 
standard error of the estimated long-run price elasticity, we let β0 = γ1 + γ2 + γ3 denote 
the long-run price elasticity and write γ1 in terms of β0, γ2, and γ3 as γ1 = β0 – γ2 – γ3. 
Using this to substitute for γ1 in Eq. (2), we obtain
log(yit) = α + (β0 – γ2 – γ3) log(pit-1) + γ2 log(pit-2) + γ3 log(pit-3) + xtρ + δt + ci + uit
= α + β0 log(pit-1) + γ2 log(pit-2 – pit-1) + γ3 log(pit-3 – pit-1) + xtρ + δt + ci + uit (3)
The coefficient and associated standard error on pit-1, which are what we need, are 
shown in Table 4. The estimate is not statistically significant. There are two possible 
explanations for the result. The first is that the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption is 
considerably different across carriers, and thus the OLS, which show the average 
relationship between variables, may indicate only a limited aspect of the effect of price 
on jet fuel consumption. The second is that the presence of a positive rebound effect 
offsets the reduction in jet fuel consumption in the long run. The first and second 
possibilities are examined in subsections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
[Table 4: Long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption estimated by OLS]
4.2 Quantile regression estimates from the static model
The OLS regression measures the average relationship between jet fuel 
consumption and movements in fuel prices. This may provide only a partial view of the 
relationship. Indeed, jet fuel consumption is marked by continuous distribution and 
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changes that may not be revealed by an examination of averages. For example, lower 
consumption quantiles would contain a large number of smaller carriers, while upper 
consumption quantiles contain a large number of larger carriers. Smaller carriers may be 
more vulnerable than larger carriers to the fuel price increases because smaller carriers’ 
financial resources are usually limited compared to larger carriers. In contrast, it is often 
assumed that larger carriers enjoy some cost advantages over smaller carriers due to 
their large-volume and long-term fuel purchasing contracts or fuel hedging strategy or 
both. Fuel hedging means “locking in the cost of future fuel purchases” (Morrel and 
Swan, 2006) via a commodity swap or option. Although fuel hedging prevents air 
carriers from gaining from a sudden drop of fuel price, it protects them against losses 
from a sudden rise of fuel price. Thus, this contractual tool makes it possible for air 
carriers to stabilize their fuel costs (Berghöfer and Lucey, 2014; Lim and Hong, 2014). 
These advantages may help larger carriers mitigate the impact of jet fuel price increases 
and result in a smaller price elasticity of jet fuel consumption for larger carriers.
The effect of aviation fuel tax on jet fuel consumption may vary when the price 
elasticity of jet fuel consumption differs across the quantiles of fuel consumption. 
Consequently, the estimation results from the OLS regression (Tables 3 and 4), which 
show the average relationship between jet fuel consumption and movements in fuel 
prices, may indicate only a limited aspect of the effect of fuel price increase on jet fuel 
consumption.
To examine the above possibilities and obtain a more complete picture, we 
reestimate Eqs. (2) and (3) using simultaneous quantile regression. This method is used 
because it enables examination of the impact of a covariate on either the full distribution 
or a particular percentile of the distribution, as opposed to just the conditional mean 
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(Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In other words, the quantile 
regression method provides information concerning the relationship between jet fuel 
consumption and jet fuel price at different points in the conditional distribution of the 
jet fuel consumption.
Columns 1 to 9 in panel A of Table 5 report fuel price coefficients from the model 
with year fixed effects. Rogers (1992) reports that “[although] the standard errors 
obtained [for the quantile regression estimates] using a method suggested by Koenker 
and Bassett (1982) ... appear adequate in the case of homoscedastic errors, they are 
probably understated if the errors are heteroscedastic” (see also Rogers (1993)). In our 
models, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity rejects the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Thus, we obtain estimates of the standard errors by 
using bootstrap resampling of 1000 replications. All the coefficients of pit-1 are negative 
and statistically significant except for the 0.8 and 0.9 quantiles. However, again, the 
coefficients of all the control variables do not show the expected negative signs except 
for the annual total miles flown variable. Indeed, the coefficients of the September 11 
attacks dummy have positive signs for the 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, and 0.8 quantiles. The 
coefficients of the average miles flown per gallon variable also have positive signs for 
the 0.1, 0.7, and 0.8 quantiles. On top of that, all the coefficients of the unemployment 
rate variable have positive signs except for the 0.9 quantile. Most of the coefficients 
with wrong signs are not statistically significant. But here again the results suggest that 
the model is not properly specified. Hence, we include the US annual average of 
monthly per capita personal income in Eq. (2) instead of the year fixed effects.
[Table 5: Estimation results from simultaneous quantile regression (static model)]
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Panel B of Table 5 reports the results. In this model, all the coefficients of pit-1 are 
negative and statistically significant. The coefficient estimates of pit-1 for each quantile 
generally decreased compared to the estimates reported in panel A of Table 5. 
Regarding the control variables, the coefficients of the September 11 attacks dummy 
and the average miles flown per gallon variable still have wrong signs for the 0.1, 0.8, 
and 0.9 quantiles. However, the coefficients of the unemployment rate variable have the 
expected negative signs for all the quantiles, though none of them is statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficients of the income variable have the expected 
positive signs and are statistically significant for all the quantiles. Thus, we consider the 
model shown in panel B of Table 5 to be more appropriate for our data set.
The results apparently suggest that the jet fuel price generally has a greater impact 
at the lower quantiles than at the upper quantiles of jet fuel consumption. However, the 
Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of coefficient equality, which suggests the 
coefficients of pit-1 are the same for all the quantiles. In other words, although the 
estimated short-run price elasticities of jet fuel consumption appear to differ across the 
quantiles, they are not significantly different in a statistical sense. Nevertheless, the 
above results are important because the estimates from the quantile regression suggest 
that the OLS estimates of the short-run price elasticities are negatively biased to some 
extent. Indeed, the OLS coefficient of pit-1 (-0.414) differs considerably from the 
quantile regression coefficients, even that for the 0.1 quantile (-0.350). Moreover, a 
different pattern may be observed for the long-run price elasticities, which will be 
estimated in the next subsection.
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Regarding the control variables, the September 11 attacks dummy has negative 
coefficients for all the quantiles except for the 0.1, 0.8, and 0.9 quantiles. However, 
none of the coefficients is statistically significant. The September 11 attacks dummy 
equals 1 for 2001 and 2002 and 0 otherwise. Thus, the effects of the September 11 
attacks may have been largely absorbed by year fixed effects. The coefficients of the 
unemployment rate variable have the expected negative signs, though none is 
statistically significant. In contrast, the income variable has the expected positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for all the quantiles. All coefficients of the total 
miles flown variable have the expected positive signs. They are also statistically 
significant except for the 0.8 and 0.9 quantiles. None of the coefficients of the annual 
industry average miles flown per gallon is statistically significant. Besides, the sign of 
the coefficients is positive for the 0.1, 0.8, and 0.9 quantiles. This may be caused by the 
rebound effect: improved fuel efficiency provides an incentive to use more fuel. This 
possibility will also be examined in the next subsection.
4.3 Quantile regression estimates from the distributed lag model
In this section, we examine whether the rebound effect is higher for larger carriers 
by estimating the long-run price elasticity of jet fuel consumption at different points in 
the conditional distribution of the jet fuel consumption. The rebound effect in fuel 
consumption may be higher for larger carriers. Indeed, carriers belonging to the upper 
consumption quantiles generally serve more routes and offer higher flight frequency 
than carriers belonging to the middle and lower quantiles. If the rebound effect is 
amplified by the larger route networks and higher flight frequency, it would provide 
larger carriers a stronger incentive to consume more fuel. Thus, the long-run price 
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elasticity of jet fuel consumption would be greater for smaller carriers than for larger 
carriers.
[Table 6: Estimation results from simultaneous quantile regression (distributed lag 
model)]
Panel A of Table 6 reports the estimates from the distributed lag model with year 
fixed effects using simultaneous quantile regression. The results show that none of the 
fuel cost per gallon variables (t-1, t-2, and t-3) is statistically significant. Moreover, 
more than half of the coefficients of the September 11 attacks dummy, the average 
miles flown variable, and the unemployment rate variable do not have the expected 
negative signs. In contrast, panel B of Table 6 shows that when we include the income 
variable instead of the year fixed effects, all the coefficients of the fuel cost per gallon 
variable (t-1) are statistically significant except for the 0.1 and 0.5 quantiles. Also, more 
than half of the coefficients of the above-mentioned control variables have the expected 
negative signs. Besides, the coefficient of the unemployment rate variable for the 0.9 
quantile is statistically significant. Hence, here again, we consider the latter model 
shown in panel B to be more appropriate than the former model shown in panel A.
The estimated long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption in column 1 of Table 7 
is, for example, -0.346 (≒ -0.186 – 0.151 – 0.00876) for the 0.1 quantile. To obtain the 
standard errors of the estimated long-run price elasticities based on the results shown in 
panel B of Table 6, we employed the same substitution trick used in section 4.2 and 
estimated Eq. (3) by simultaneous quantile regression. The long-run price elasticities 
and associated standard errors for each quantile are shown in Table 7. All the 
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coefficients have the expected negative signs. But again, the Wald test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of coefficient equality. Thus, the estimated long-run price elasticities 
of jet fuel consumption, which appear to differ across the quantiles, are not significantly 
different in a statistical sense. However, it is important to note that Table 7 suggests that 
the long-run price elasticities for each quantile are consistently smaller than the short-
run price elasticities (see Table 5). More important is that the long-run price elasticities 
are statistically significant only for the 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 quantiles. This means that 
the price elasticities, which are statistically significant for all quantiles in the short run, 
decrease over time and become zero for other quantiles (0.4 and 0.6 through 0.9). The 
results suggest that the presence of a positive rebound effect may offset the reduction in 
jet fuel consumption in the long run. The estimates shown in Table 7 further suggest 
that the rebound effect in jet fuel consumption may be higher for larger carriers. Indeed, 
none of the price elasticities is statistically significant for the 0.6 quantile or above. In 
general, larger carriers enjoy advantages due to their large-volume fuel procurement 
contracts or hedging strategy or both (Berghöfer and Lucey, 2014; Lim and Hong, 
2014). The relative advantage of larger carriers in terms of fuel cost may make it 
possible for them to minimize the effect of an increase in fuel price in the long run. 
Moreover, carriers belonging to the upper consumption quantiles generally serve more 
routes and offer higher flight frequency than carriers belonging to the middle and lower 
quantiles. Therefore, the rebound effect may be amplified for larger carriers by their 
larger route networks and higher flight frequency.
[Table 7: Long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption estimated by simultaneous 
quantile regression]
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We regard the results shown in panel B of Table 5 and Table 7 as the most credible 
estimates for the short-run and long-run price elasticities of jet fuel consumption. The 
results can be summarized as follows: (1) the short-run price elasticities are negative 
and statistically significant for all quantiles and vary from -0.350 (0.1 quantile) to -
0.166 (0.9 quantile), though they are not significantly different in a statistical sense; (2) 
the long-run price elasticities are negative and statistically significant only for the 0.1, 
0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 quantiles and vary from -0.346 (0.1 quantile) to -0.166 (0.5 quantile) , 
though, again, they are not significantly different in a statistical sense; (3) the presence 
of a positive rebound effect may offset the reduction in jet fuel consumption in the long 
run; and (4) the rebound effect may be higher for larger carriers. Thus, taken together, 
the results suggest that an increase in fuel prices due to fuel taxation could have a larger 
impact on smaller carriers than on larger carriers with regard to fuel consumption.
5 Calculation of the effect of an increase in aviation fuel tax on reductions in fuel 
consumption and CO2 emissions
Based on the estimated price elasticities, we estimate the aviation fuel consumption 
effect resulting from a 10-cent aviation fuel tax increase (estimated elasticity × 
percentage change in the after-tax aviation fuel price in a given year due to a 10-cent 
increase in aviation fuel tax [10-cent increase in aviation fuel tax / after-tax aviation fuel 
price in a given year] × 100). We then estimate the reduction in fuel consumption based 
on the aviation fuel consumption effect. The International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the US EPA 
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propose slightly different default emission factors for jet fuel (see Table 8). Thus, we 
used three different emission factors to calculate the reduction in CO2 emissions.
Panel A of Table 8 shows the results of the calculation based on the scenario of a 
10-cent increase in aviation fuel tax, for which we used the values of fuel price and CO2 
emissions from 2012. The results suggest that, in total, an increase in aviation fuel tax 
of 10 cents leads to reductions in annual aviation fuel consumption and CO2 emissions 
in the US by about 1624 million gallons and 15.8 to 19.4 million metric tons, 
respectively. A 10-cent aviation fuel tax increase reduces annual CO2 emissions in the 
US by approximately 0.33 percent to 0.41 percent. However, the highest increase in 
aviation fuel tax during the period of analysis was 4.3 cents. Hence, we also calculate 
the effect of a 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase on fuel consumption and CO2 
emissions. The results are not particularly impressive. As shown in Panel B of Table 8, 
based on this scenario, the reductions in annual jet fuel consumption and CO2 emissions 
in the US fall to approximately 698 million gallons and 6.8 to 8.3 million metric tons, 
respectively. A 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase reduces CO2 emissions in the US by 
approximately 0.14 percent to 0.18 percent.
[Table 8: Short-run effect of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions]
In the long run, the impact of an increase in aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption 
and CO2 emissions could be further reduced due to the presence of a positive rebound 
effect. Panels A and B of Table 9 indicate the results of the calculation based on the 
scenarios of a 10-cent and a 4.3-cent increase in aviation fuel tax. In the scenario of a 
10-cent increase in aviation fuel tax, the reductions in annual jet fuel consumption and 
25
CO2 emissions in the US are approximately 93 million gallons and 0.9 to 1.1 million 
metric tons, respectively. However, in the more realistic scenario of a 4.3-cent increase 
in aviation fuel tax, the reductions in annual jet fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in 
the US decrease to approximately 40 million gallons and 0.4 to 0.5 million metric tons, 
respectively. After 3 years, a permanent 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase contributes 
to the reduction of CO2 emissions in the US by only about 0.008 percent to 0.01 percent. 
Even if air carriers account for only about 3.5 percent of the GHG emissions inventory 
in the US, the long-run emission reduction effect is rather small: it represents only about 
a 0.2- to 0.3-percent reduction of CO2 emissions in the US aviation sector. In any case, 
the impact of a 4.3-cent increase in aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 
emissions seems to be almost negligible in the long run.
[Table 9: Long-run effect of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions]
An implicit assumption of the above estimation is that the aviation fuel tax would 
be passed on fully to carriers. However, if the aviation fuel suppliers bear part of the 
fuel tax burden, the reductions in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions caused by the 
fuel tax would fall further. To examine the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to 
aviation fuel price, we regress changes in aviation fuel prices on changes in aviation 
fuel tax (cf. Davis and Kilian, 2011; Marion and Muehlegger, 2011). The pass-through 
rate refers to how the burden of a fuel tax is distributed between sellers and buyers of jet 
fuel. Our estimation model has the following specification.
log(pit) = θ + βlog(taxt)+ xtρ + δt + uit (4)
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The aviation fuel tax in the US applies only to domestic flights; international flights 
are exempt from the aviation fuel tax (US IRS, 1999). In addition, as Table 1 shows, the 
tax rate on aviation fuel in the US has not changed since 1998. Therefore, we estimate 
the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to aviation fuel price by using the data for 
domestic flights during the period between 1995 and 2000, i.e., the 3 years in which tax 
changes occurred and the next 3 years in which no tax changes occurred.
In Eq. (4), the subscripts i and t represent carrier and year, respectively. The 
dependent variable, pit, is the annual average inflation-adjusted after-tax price of jet fuel 
for domestic flights (per gallon) paid by each carrier in US dollars (Source: DOT, Form 
41 Financial Data, Schedule P-12(a)). The explanatory variable, taxt, is the aviation fuel 
tax (Source: US IRS, Publication 510). The controls, xt, are as follows: each carrier’s 
annual total miles flown on domestic flights (logged) (t-1); all carriers’ annual average 
miles flown per gallon on domestic routes (logged) (t-1); US annual average national 
unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (percent); and annual average of US monthly 
per capita personal income (logged). The aggregate time effects, δt, are also included in 
Eq. (4). The error, uit, is a time-varying error.
[Table 10: Effect of a change of aviation fuel tax on the change of jet fuel price]
[Table 11: Estimated average annual pass-through rate (percent) of aviation fuel tax to 
aviation fuel price]
Table 10 shows the estimated price elasticities with respect to aviation fuel tax, 
while Table 11 shows the estimated average annual pass-through rate of aviation fuel 
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tax to aviation fuel price. We obtained price elasticities by estimating Eq. (4) using OLS. 
The price elasticity obtained from the OLS estimate with year fixed effects is 0.0406 
(column 1 of Table 10). The price elasticity slightly increases to 0.0466 when we 
estimate the model by including the annual average of US monthly per capita personal 
income variable instead of the year fixed effects (column 2 of Table 10). (Here also, we 
tried to include both effects in the model, but it was impossible due to 
multicollinearity.)
An increase in aviation fuel price due to a 1 percent fuel tax increase—which can 
be calculated by multiplying the after-tax aviation fuel price at a given time by the 
estimated price elasticity (0.0406 or 0.0466)—would be equal to a 1 percent increase in 
aviation fuel tax multiplied by the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to carriers. Thus, 
calculated using the mean value of the after-tax aviation fuel price in 2000 (0.588 US 
dollars per gallon) and the value of the aviation fuel tax in 2000 (0.044 US dollars per 
gallon), the average pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to carriers in 2000 was 
approximately 54.3 percent to 62.3 percent (columns 1 and 2 of Table 11). The 
estimated pass-through rates are less than 100 percent. These results suggest that 
aviation fuel taxes have not been passed fully to carriers, and thus, our calculation 
overestimated the amount of reductions in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions: the 
actual amount of reductions could be much smaller than the current estimates.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the effect of an aviation fuel tax increase on reductions in fuel 
consumption and CO2 emissions, using data from the US airline industry. Our quantile 
regression estimates from the unbalanced annual panel of US carriers from 1995 to 
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2013 suggest that (1) the short-run price elasticities vary from -0.350 (0.1 quantile) to -
0.166 (0.9 quantile), though they are not significantly different in a statistical sense; (2) 
the long-run price elasticities vary from -0.346 (0.1 quantile) to -0.166 (0.5 quantile) 
and are statistically significant only for the 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 quantiles (though, 
again, they are not significantly different in a statistical sense); (3) the presence of a 
positive rebound effect may offset the reduction in jet fuel consumption in the long run; 
and (4) the rebound effect may be higher for larger carriers. The results for the long-run 
price elasticities suggest that an increase in fuel prices due to fuel tax has a larger 
impact on smaller carriers than on larger carriers. Due to the low price elasticities and 
the low proportion of carriers affected by fuel tax with regard to fuel consumption, the 
expected reduction in CO2 emissions resulting from a 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase, 
the highest increase in aviation fuel tax in the US during the period of analysis, is also 
significantly low: when calculated using values from 2012, the short-run reductions in 
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in the US were approximately 698 million gallons 
and 6.8 to 8.3 million metric tons, respectively. The short-run reduction in CO2 
emissions in the US resulting from a 4.3-cent increase in aviation fuel tax is only around 
0.14 percent to 0.18 percent. In the long run, the presence of a positive rebound effect 
would reduce the impact of an increase in aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and 
CO2 emissions. A 4.3-cent increase in aviation fuel tax would reduce annual jet fuel 
consumption and CO2 emissions in the US by approximately 40 million gallons and 0.4 
to 0.5 million metric tons, respectively. After 3 years, a permanent 4.3-cent aviation fuel 
tax increase would contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions in the US by only about 
0.008 percent to 0.01 percent. The long-run emission reduction effect resulting from a 
permanent 4.3-cent fuel tax increase is only about a 0.2- to 0.3-percent reduction of CO2 
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emissions in the US aviation sector. This means that in the long run, if we are to achieve 
a 1-percent reduction of CO2 emissions in the US aviation sector, the aviation fuel tax 
needs to be about 3 to 5 times higher than the current level. In addition, the pass-
through rate of aviation fuel tax to carriers seems to be less than 1: the estimated 
average pass-through rate was approximately 54.3 percent to 62.3 percent in 2000. This 
suggests that aviation fuel taxes have not been passed fully to carriers, and thus, the 
actual amount of reductions could be much smaller than the current estimates. In sum, 
our estimates based on historical data suggest that the reduction in CO2 emissions 
resulting from a (perhaps) politically feasible increase in aviation fuel tax is almost 
negligible. (Olsthoorn (2001) reached similar conclusions, though the magnitudes of 
estimated price elasticity of jet fuel consumption and estimated reduction in CO2 
emissions are different from those of our estimations.)
The results of our study indicate grim implications for policymaking using the 
MBM with regard to the role of aviation fuel tax in reducing CO2 emissions. Our 
analysis suggests that fuel tax has certainly contributed to a reduction in CO2 emissions. 
However, the scope and size of its impact is fairly limited and small; the effectiveness 
of fuel tax as a policy tool to control fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in the 
aviation sector is neither impressive nor promising.
Another important finding is that the levels of the impact of fuel tax vary depending 
on the size of carriers: an increase in fuel prices due to fuel tax has a larger impact on 
smaller carriers than on larger carriers. Put differently, our estimation results suggest 
that carriers less able to generate revenues bear a disproportionate burden in terms of 
CO2 emissions reduction. Even if fuel tax could be an effective policy tool to control 
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in the aviation sector, it could have uneven effects 
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on carriers and intensify underlying inequities among them. Although emissions trading 
schemes could be an important complementary tool in a CO2 emissions reduction policy, 
they also have similar equity issues (Miyoshi, 2014). Indeed, the first multinational 
emissions trading scheme, the EU ETS, has raised many regulatory issues and 
objections, including from the Chicago Convention. Although it is a cost-effective 
measure, the ETS produces “winners and losers” among participants due to the timing 
of the scheme implemented. For the global ETS mechanism, equity issues among 
carriers and countries cannot be avoided. A recent study estimates that 92 percent of 
fuel burning takes place in the Northern Hemisphere, and 67 percent of this occurs 
between 30° N and 60° N (Simone et al., 2013).
Thus, in developing economic instruments such as fuel tax and an emissions trading 
system, considering equity is a key element (Button, 2005; Eliasson and Mattsson, 
2006; Small and Verhoef, 2007). For example, a de minimis exemption to exclude small 
emitters (small fuel users) could be considered. To make fuel tax a more effective 
policy instrument for reducing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions, it is necessary to 
undertake further research to analyze and design a tax scheme that would address the 
uneven effects of fuel taxation and help reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions 
more effectively. The combined effects of an emissions trading system and fuel tax 
should also be analyzed in future research.
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Month and Year
Fuel consumption (gal.) per mile flown - All US carriers
Total fuel consumption (mil. gals.) - All US carriers
Source: US DOT, Form 41 Financial Data, Schedule P-12(a)
              US DOT, Form 41 Traffic, T-100 Domestic Segment (All Carriers)
              US DOT, Form 41 Traffic, T-100 International Segment (All Carriers)
38






























Jan 1990 Jan 1995 Jan 2000 Jan 2005 Jan 2010 Dec 2013
Month and Year
Miles flown (dom. + intl.) (million miles) - All US carriers
Source: US DOT, Form 41 Traffic, T-100 Domestic Segment (All Carriers)
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Annual ratio of CO2 from all commercial flights by US carriers
Annual CO2 from domestic commercial flights by US carriers
Annual CO2 from international commercial flights by US carriers
Unit: MMTCO2 (Million Metric Tons CO2)
Source: US EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks
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Table 1: Tax rates on aviation fuel in the US since 1994
Year Quarter Commercial use of aviation fuel ($)
1994 1 through 4 0.001
1995 1 through 34
0.001
0.044
1996 1 through 4 0.043
1997 1 through 34
0.043
0.044
1998 1 through 4 0.044
1999 1 through 4 0.044
2000 1 through 4 0.044
2001 1 through 4 0.044
2002 1 through 4 0.044
2003 1 through 4 0.044
2004 1 through 4 0.044
2005 1 through 4 0.044
2006 1 through 4 0.044
2007 1 through 4 0.044
2008 1 through 4 0.044
2009 1 through 4 0.044
2010 1 through 4 0.044
2011 1 through 4 0.044
2012 1 through 4 0.044
2013 1 through 4 0.044
Source: US IRS, Publication 510
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: data set for the static model (Period: 1995-2013) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and international) 
deflated by CPI (logged) (t-1) -0.243 0.498 -1.720 1.588 
September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 2002 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic and international 
flights (logged) (t-1) 16.728 2.297 5.984 20.858 
All carriers’ annual average miles flown (domestic and 
international) per gallon (logged) (t-1) -0.968 0.0796 -1.188 -0.886 
US annual average of monthly national unemployment rate 
(seasonally adjusted) (%) 5.955 1.718 3.967 9.625 
US annual average of monthly per capita personal income (logged) 10.411 0.0936 10.210 10.523 
Observations 1024
Panel B: data set for the distributed lag model (Period: 1997-2013) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and international) 
deflated by CPI (logged) (t-1) -0.222 0.471 -1.720 1.204 
Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and international) 
deflated by CPI (logged) (t-2) -0.271 0.473 -1.181 1.547 
Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and international) 
deflated by CPI (logged) (t-3) -0.315 0.481 -1.181 1.588 
September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 2002 0.112 0.316 0 1 
Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic and international 
flights (logged) (t-1) 16.939 2.301 5.984 20.858 
All carriers’ annual average miles flown (domestic and 
international) per gallon (logged) (t-1) -0.969 0.0830 -1.188 -0.886 
US annual average of monthly national unemployment rate 
(seasonally adjusted) (%) 6.0800 1.826 3.967 9.625 
US annual average of monthly per capita personal income (logged) 10.433 0.0743 10.254 10.523 
Observations 821
Carrier and year dummies are omitted for brevity.
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Table 3: Estimation results from OLS
Dependent variable: Each carrier’s annual total jet fuel consumption (domestic and international; gallons; logged)
Static model Distributed lag model
(1) OLS: 1995-2013 (2) OLS: 1995-2013 (3) OLS: 1997-2013 (4) OLS: 1997-2013
-0.431* -0.414** -0.293 -0.247Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and 
international) deflated by CPI (logged) (t-1) (0.189) (0.131) (0.240) (0.158)
-0.103 -0.0343Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and 
international) deflated by CPI (logged) (t-2) (0.133) (0.100)
0.0948 -0.0472Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and 
international) deflated by CPI (logged) (t-3) (0.155) (0.145)
1.138 -0.151 1.986 -0.0588September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 2002 (1.685) (0.163) (1.509) (0.155)
0.278* 0.287* 0.259* 0.274*Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic and 
international flights (logged) (t-1) (0.124) (0.126) (0.129) (0.135)
4.363 -0.881 9.542 -0.711All carriers’ annual average miles flown (domestic 
and international) per gallon (logged) (t-1) (5.938) (0.775) (7.012) (0.747)
0.0157 -0.0347 0.0123 -0.0339US annual average of monthly national 
unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (%) (0.0354) (0.0265) (0.0409) (0.0338)
2.084* 1.385US annual average of monthly per capita personal 
income (logged) (0.822) (1.083)
Carrier fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 1024 1024 821 821
Adjusted R2 0.866 0.864 0.869 0.865
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by carrier.  The data set is an unbalanced panel.  Unit of observation is carrier by year.  Carrier and year 
dummies are omitted for brevity.  The federal fuel tax is included only in fuel cost for domestic flights.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4: Long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption estimated by OLS
(1) OLS: 1997-2013
-0.329Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic and 
international) deflated by CPI (logged) (t-1) (0.198)
Controls Yes
Carrier fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects No
Observations 821
Adjusted R2 0.865
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by carrier.  The data set is an unbalanced panel.  Unit of observation is carrier by year.  Carrier and year 
dummies are omitted for brevity.  The federal fuel tax is included only in fuel cost for domestic flights.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 5: Estimation results from simultaneous quantile regression (static model)
Dependent variable: Each carrier’s annual total jet fuel consumption (domestic and international; gallons; logged)
Panel A (1) Q=0.1 (2) Q=0.2 (3) Q=0.3 (4) Q=0.4 (5) Q=0.5 (6) Q=0.6 (7) Q=0.7 (8) Q=0.8 (9) Q=0.9
-0.499* -0.605** -0.538** -0.349* -0.355** -0.290* -0.242* -0.196 -0.0978Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-1) (0.211) (0.197) (0.179) (0.145) (0.125) (0.117) (0.113) (0.110) (0.114)
5.990 -0.941 0.0388 -0.604 -0.384 -0.431 0.00438 0.0439 -0.369September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 
2002 (5.441) (4.582) (3.279) (2.236) (1.697) (1.425) (1.110) (1.115) (1.124)
0.490*** 0.474*** 0.270** 0.258*** 0.242*** 0.199*** 0.156** 0.125* 0.0666Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic 
and international flights (logged) (t-1) (0.0921) (0.103) (0.0948) (0.0683) (0.0560) (0.0554) (0.0527) (0.0502) (0.0475)
21.22 -3.722 -0.251 -1.842 -1.159 -1.325 0.271 0.547 -0.888All carriers’ annual average miles flown 
(domestic and international) per gallon 
(logged) (t-1) (19.46) (16.36) (11.70) (7.966) (6.050) (5.073) (3.959) (3.966) (4.000)
0.0383 0.0562 0.0603* 0.0110 0.00912 0.00870 0.0115 0.00475 -0.00351US annual average national unemployment 
rate (seasonally adjusted) (%) (0.0342) (0.0318) (0.0293) (0.0243) (0.0207) (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.0184)
Carrier fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 1024
Pseudo R2 0.752 0.743 0.747 0.757 0.764 0.778 0.799 0.819 0.834
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Table 5 (continued): Estimation results from simultaneous quantile regression (static model)
Dependent variable: Each carrier’s annual total jet fuel consumption (domestic and international; gallons; logged)
Panel B (1) Q=0.1 (2) Q=0.2 (3) Q=0.3 (4) Q=0.4 (5) Q=0.5 (6) Q=0.6 (7) Q=0.7 (8) Q=0.8 (9) Q=0.9
-0.350** -0.318*** -0.267*** -0.220** -0.218*** -0.192*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.166**Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) (t-
1) (0.115) (0.0911) (0.0775) (0.0665) (0.0596) (0.0539) (0.0515) (0.0575) (0.0633)
0.0515 -0.00510 -0.0272 -0.0699 -0.0644 -0.0420 -0.0370 0.0330 0.00745September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 
2002 (0.0700) (0.0719) (0.0800) (0.0801) (0.0813) (0.0791) (0.0767) (0.0821) (0.0884)
0.464*** 0.466*** 0.333*** 0.275*** 0.247*** 0.189** 0.140* 0.0895 0.0383Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic 
and international flights (logged) (t-1) (0.0923) (0.0904) (0.0869) (0.0669) (0.0598) (0.0625) (0.0598) (0.0529) (0.0456)
0.121 -0.0414 -0.228 -0.425 -0.346 -0.350 -0.311 0.124 0.158All carriers’ annual average miles flown 
(domestic and international) per gallon 
(logged) (t-1) (0.321) (0.328) (0.346) (0.346) (0.334) (0.318) (0.307) (0.331) (0.369)
-0.0192 -0.00884 -0.0116 -0.0105 -0.0146 -0.0106 -0.00591 -0.00861 -0.0131US annual average of monthly national 
unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (%) (0.0165) (0.0120) (0.00938) (0.00794) (0.00747) (0.00705) (0.00710) (0.00752) (0.00793)
2.294*** 1.767*** 1.850*** 1.812*** 1.970*** 1.962*** 2.126*** 2.262*** 2.228***US annual average of monthly per capita 
personal income (logged) (0.618) (0.452) (0.390) (0.369) (0.351) (0.319) (0.284) (0.280) (0.306)
Carrier fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects No
Observations 1024
Pseudo R2 0.743 0.738 0.744 0.754 0.761 0.776 0.796 0.814 0.827
Standard errors in parentheses are obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.  The data set is an unbalanced panel.  Unit of observation is carrier by 
year.  Carrier and year dummies are omitted for brevity.  The federal fuel tax is included only in fuel cost for domestic flights.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001
47
Table 6: Estimation results from simultaneous quantile regression (distributed lag model)
Dependent variable: Each carrier’s annual total jet fuel consumption (domestic and international; gallons; logged)
Panel A (1) Q=0.1 (2) Q=0.2 (3) Q=0.3 (4) Q=0.4 (5) Q=0.5 (6) Q=0.6 (7) Q=0.7 (8) Q=0.8 (9) Q=0.9
-0.366 -0.475 -0.340 -0.247 -0.110 -0.00436 -0.0797 -0.152 -0.129Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-1) (0.267) (0.254) (0.230) (0.208) (0.188) (0.177) (0.165) (0.152) (0.147)
-0.0619 -0.0233 0.0181 -0.0638 -0.0985 -0.0489 -0.0525 -0.0600 -0.0241Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-2) (0.255) (0.211) (0.174) (0.155) (0.150) (0.151) (0.149) (0.143) (0.137)
0.156 0.129 0.0159 0.0590 0.0786 0.0380 0.113 0.191 0.0968Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-3) (0.207) (0.165) (0.126) (0.110) (0.103) (0.106) (0.111) (0.105) (0.0938)
11.41 3.929 2.954 1.212 -0.193 0.127 0.337 0.242 -0.238September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 
2002 (7.852) (7.221) (6.047) (4.970) (4.058) (3.391) (3.002) (2.366) (2.362)
0.513*** 0.437*** 0.299** 0.240* 0.212** 0.180* 0.167* 0.0954 0.0402Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic 
and international flights (logged) (t-1) (0.118) (0.127) (0.115) (0.0943) (0.0797) (0.0710) (0.0667) (0.0599) (0.0494)
40.36 13.56 10.23 4.403 -0.581 0.721 1.284 1.104 -0.611All carriers’ annual average miles flown 
(domestic and international) per gallon 
(logged) (t-1) (28.03) (25.78) (21.58) (17.74) (14.49) (12.11) (10.71) (8.428) (8.394)
0.0254 0.0406 0.0387 0.0124 0.00239 -0.0132 -0.0134 -0.0154 -0.00706US annual average of monthly national 
unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (%) (0.0534) (0.0467) (0.0411) (0.0363) (0.0323) (0.0285) (0.0242) (0.0215) (0.0215)
Carrier fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 821
Pseudo R2 0.766 0.757 0.763 0.769 0.778 0.791 0.809 0.829 0.840
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Table 6 (continued): Estimation results from simultaneous quantile regression (distributed lag model)
Dependent variable: Each carrier’s annual total jet fuel consumption (domestic and international; gallons; logged)
Panel B (1) Q=0.1 (2) Q=0.2 (3) Q=0.3 (4) Q=0.4 (5) Q=0.5 (6) Q=0.6 (7) Q=0.7 (8) Q=0.8 (9) Q=0.9
-0.186 -0.220* -0.211** -0.166* -0.120 -0.115* -0.116* -0.147* -0.130*Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-1) (0.0962) (0.0895) (0.0790) (0.0680) (0.0614) (0.0565) (0.0557) (0.0574) (0.0595)
-0.151 -0.0459 0.0257 -0.0306 -0.0782 -0.0780 -0.0986 -0.0595 -0.0272Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-2) (0.0911) (0.0776) (0.0693) (0.0644) (0.0598) (0.0567) (0.0584) (0.0596) (0.0613)
-0.00876 -0.0339 -0.0413 0.0225 0.0320 0.0601 0.0712 0.111 0.0873Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-3) (0.103) (0.0934) (0.0772) (0.0694) (0.0631) (0.0613) (0.0657) (0.0675) (0.0644)
0.0818 0.0347 -0.0151 -0.0723 -0.000150 -0.00952 -0.00764 0.0648 0.0555September 11 attacks dummy: 1 for 2001 and 
2002 (0.0585) (0.0654) (0.0760) (0.0808) (0.0840) (0.0853) (0.0835) (0.0796) (0.0775)
0.522*** 0.482*** 0.338** 0.257** 0.213** 0.159* 0.150* 0.0718 0.0449Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic 
and international flights (logged) (t-1) (0.102) (0.110) (0.105) (0.0882) (0.0799) (0.0755) (0.0688) (0.0549) (0.0440)
0.197 0.0674 -0.214 -0.511 -0.181 -0.262 -0.0814 0.215 0.292All carriers’ annual average miles flown 
(domestic and international) per gallon 
(logged) (t-1) (0.313) (0.329) (0.353) (0.361) (0.363) (0.356) (0.350) (0.346) (0.331)
0.00455 -0.00225 -0.0120 -0.0122 -0.0144 -0.0168 -0.0163 -0.0187 -0.0216*US annual average of monthly national 
unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (%) (0.0215) (0.0161) (0.0126) (0.0106) (0.00970) (0.00977) (0.0102) (0.00988) (0.00928)
2.090*** 1.867*** 1.696** 1.707*** 1.861*** 1.774*** 1.507*** 1.668*** 1.330***US annual average of monthly per capita 
personal income (logged) (0.511) (0.532) (0.524) (0.481) (0.450) (0.424) (0.400) (0.376) (0.387)
Carrier fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects No
Observations 821
Pseudo R2 0.757 0.752 0.760 0.767 0.775 0.788 0.805 0.823 0.832
Standard errors in parentheses are obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.  The data set is an unbalanced panel.  Unit of observation is carrier by 
year.  Carrier and year dummies are omitted for brevity.  The federal fuel tax is included only in fuel cost for domestic flights.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 7: Long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption estimated by simultaneous quantile regression
(1) Q=0.1 (2) Q=0.2 (3) Q=0.3 (4) Q=0.4 (5) Q=0.5 (6) Q=0.6 (7) Q=0.7 (8) Q=0.8 (9) Q=0.9
-0.346** -0.300* -0.227* -0.174 -0.166* -0.133 -0.143 -0.0958 -0.0701Carrier’s annual fuel cost per gallon (domestic 
and international) deflated by CPI (logged) 
(t-1) (0.130) (0.123) (0.106) (0.0907) (0.0836) (0.0811) (0.0783) (0.0749) (0.0707)
Controls All
Carrier fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects No
Observations 821
Pseudo R2 0.757 0.752 0.760 0.767 0.775 0.788 0.805 0.823 0.832
Standard errors in parentheses are obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.  The data set is an unbalanced panel.  Unit of observation is carrier by 
year.  Control variables are omitted for brevity.  The federal fuel tax is included only in fuel cost for domestic flights.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001
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Table 8: Short-run effect of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions
Emission factor for jet fuel (kg CO2 per gallon)
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Table 8 (continued): Short-run effect of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions
Emission factor for jet fuel (kg CO2 per gallon)
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Source: IATA, Carbon Offset Program - Frequently Asked Questions, Version9, 17 January 2014 (IATA, 2014), p.8.
IPCC, 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (corrected as of June 2014), Volume 2 – Energy, Chapter 2 (Stationary 
Combustion), p.16; Chapter 3 (Mobile Combustion), p.64.
US EPA, Emission Factors for Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Last Modified: 4 April 2014, Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 9: Long-run effect of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions
Emission factor for jet fuel (kg CO2 per gallon)
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consumption (1000 
gallons) (2012)
Reduction in CO2 emissions (MMTCO2) (2012)
(Percentage reduction in CO2 emissions)



























Source: IATA, Carbon Offset Program - Frequently Asked Questions, Version9, 17 January 2014 (IATA, 2014), p.8.
IPCC, 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (corrected as of June 2014), Volume 2 – Energy, Chapter 2 (Stationary 
Combustion), p.16; Chapter 3 (Mobile Combustion), p.64.
US EPA, Emission Factors for Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Last Modified: 4 April 2014, Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 10: Effect of a change of aviation fuel tax on the change of jet fuel price
Dependent variable: Each carrier’s annual jet fuel cost per gallon with fuel tax ($) 
deflated by CPI (logged)
(1) Model 1 (2) Model 2
0.0406*** 0.0466***Tax Rates on Aviation Jet Fuel 
($) deflated by CPI (logged) (0.00947) (0.00517)
Controls Excluding the income variable All
Carrier fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.856 0.563
Observations 297
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by carrier.  Carrier and year fixed effects are omitted for 
brevity.  Controls are as follows: Carrier’s annual total miles flown on domestic flights (logged) (t-1); 
All carriers’ annual average miles flown (domestic) per gallon (logged) (t-1); US annual average national 
unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) (%); and annual average of US monthly per capita personal 
income (logged).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 11: Estimated average annual pass-through rate (%) of aviation fuel tax to 
aviation fuel price







Appendix A: Data sources
Aviation Fuel Consumption & Aviation Fuel Price
US Department of Transportation, Air Carrier Financial Reports (Form 41 
Financial Data), Schedule P-12(a)
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=294
Aviation Fuel Tax
US Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Publication 510 (Prior 
Year Forms and Publications)
http://apps.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/priorFormPublication.html
http://www.irs.gov/Forms-&-Pubs/Prior-Year-Forms
Market Segment Specialization Program - Aviation Tax
US Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service




US EPA - National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data - Inventory of U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2012 (April 2014)
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html
Emission factors




IPCC, 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (corrected 
as of June 2014), Volume 2 – Energy
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/index.html
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol2.html





Monthly per capita income
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP and the 
National Income and Product Account (NIPA) Historical Tables, Table 2.6. 
Personal Income and Its Disposition, Monthly [Billions of dollars; months 





US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, National Intercensal 






Monthly unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted)
US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics 
including the National Unemployment Rate (Current Population Survey - CPS); 
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey; Series Id: 
LNS14000000; Seasonally Adjusted; Series title: (Seas) Unemployment Rate; 
Labor force status; Unemployment rate; Type of data: Percent or rate; Age: 16 





Appendix B: List of air carriers appeared in the data set, 1995 - 2013
Serial Number Carrier code Carrier name Years covered by the data set
1 16 PSA Airlines Inc. 2005-2010
2 0JQ Vision Airlines 2012
3 0WQ Avjet Corporation 2011-2013
5V Tatonduk Outfitters Limited d/b/a Tatonduk Flying Service 2000-20034
5V Tatonduk Outfitters Limited d/b/a Everts Air Alaska and Everts Air Cargo 2005-2007, 2010-2011, 2013
5 5X United Parcel Service 1995-2013
6 5Y Atlas Air Inc. 1996-2013
7 8C Air Transport International 2000-2013
8 9E Pinnacle Airlines Inc. 2005-2006
9 9L Colgan Air 2009-2012
10 9S Southern Air Inc. 2004-2007
11 AA American Airlines Inc. 1995-2013
ABX Airborne Express Inc. 2003-200512 ABX ABX Air, Inc. 2006-2009, 2011-2013
13 AJQ Aerodynamics Inc. 2004-2011
14 AS Alaska Airlines Inc. 1995-2013
15 AX Trans States Airlines 1995-2007
16 B6 JetBlue Airways 2001-2013
17 BF Markair Inc. 1995
18 BFQ Buffalo Airways Inc. 1996
CDQ American International Airways Inc. 1995-199819 CDQ Kitty Hawk International 1999-2000
20 CO Continental Air Lines Inc. 1995-2011
21 CP Compass Airlines 2008-2010
DH Atlantic Coast Airlines 200422 DH Independence Air 2005
23 DL Delta Air Lines Inc. 1995-2013
24 E0 EOS Airlines, Inc. 2008
25 E9 Boston-Maine Airways 2007-2008
ER DHL Airways 1995-2003
ER Astar Air Cargo Inc. 2004-2007, 200926
ER Astar USA, LLC 2011-2012
EV Atlantic Southeast Airlines 1995-201127 EV ExpressJet Airlines Inc. 1996-2001, 2003-2013
28 EZ Evergreen International Inc. 1995-2007, 2009
29 F2 Omega Air Holdings d/b/a Focus Air 2008
30 F8 Freedom Airlines d/b/a HP Expr 2004
31 F9 Frontier Airlines Inc. 1995-2013
32 FCQ Falcon Air Express 2002-2006
33 FDQ Great American Airways 1997
34 FE Primaris Airlines Inc. 2005
35 FF Tower Air Inc. 1995-2000
36 FL AirTran Airways Corporation 1998-2012
37 FNQ Fine Airlines Inc. 1998-2000
38 FX Federal Express Corporation 1995-1997, 1999-2013
39 G4 Allegiant Air 2005-2013
40 G7 GoJet Airlines, LLC d/b/a United Express 2006-2012
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Serial Number Carrier code Carrier name Years covered by the data set
41 GFQ Gulf And Caribbean Cargo 2008-2009, 2012-2013
42 GL Miami Air International 1995-2013
43 GR Gemini Air Cargo Airways 1997-2008
44 HA Hawaiian Airlines Inc. 1995-2013
45 HCQ Av Atlantic 1997
46 HP America West Airlines Inc. 1995-2007
47 HQ (1) Business Express 1995-1996
48 J7 Valujet Airlines Inc. 1996-1998
49 JI (1) Midway Airlines Inc. 1997-1999
50 JKQ Express One International Inc. 1995-2001
51 JW Arrow Air Inc. 1995-2004, 2007, 2009-2010
52 JX Southeast Airlines 2004
53 KAQ Kalitta Air LLC 2004-2013
54 KH Aloha Air Cargo 2010-2013
55 KLQ Kalitta Charters II 2013
56 KP Kiwi International 1995-1999
57 KR Kitty Hawk Aircargo 1996-2007
58 KW Carnival Air Lines Inc. 1995-1998
59 L2 Lynden Air Cargo Airlines 2000-2013
60 L3 Lynx Aviation d/b/a Frontier Airlines 2010-2011
61 M6 Amerijet International 2001-2002, 2004-2013
MG MGM Grand Air Inc. 1995-199662 MG Champion Air 1997-2008
MQ Simmons Airlines 1995-199863 MQ American Eagle Airlines Inc. 1999-2011
64 N7 National Airlines 2000-2002
65 NA North American Airlines 1995, 2000-2013
66 NC Northern Air Cargo Inc. 2003-2013
67 NJ Vanguard Airlines Inc. 1998-2002
68 NK Spirit Air Lines 1996-2013
69 NW Northwest Airlines Inc. 1995-2009
70 OH Comair Inc. 2003-2012
71 OO SkyWest Airlines Inc. 2004-2013
72 OW Executive Airlines 1995-2011
73 PA (2) Pan American World Airways 1997-1998
74 PCQ Pace Airlines 2004-2009
75 PN Pan American Airways Corp. 2003-2004
76 PO Polar Air Cargo Airways 1995-2013
77 PRQ Florida West Airlines Inc. 1999-2010
78 QQ Reno Air Inc. 1995-1999
79 QX Horizon Air 1995-2010
80 RD Ryan International Airlines 1999-2010
81 RIQ Rich International Airways 1995-1996
82 RLQ Reliant Airlines 2002
83 RP Chautauqua Airlines Inc. 2013
84 S5 Shuttle America Corp. 2006-2013
85 SAQ Southern Air Transport Inc. 1995-1997
86 SLQ Sky King Inc. 2012-2013
87 SPQ Sun Pacific International 1999
88 SX Skybus Airlines, Inc. 2008
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Serial Number Carrier code Carrier name Years covered by the data set
SY Sun Country Airlines 1995-200489 SY Sun Country Airlines d/b/a MN Airlines 2005-2013
90 T9 TransMeridian Airlines 1999-2005
91 TB (1) USAir Shuttle 1996
TCQ Trans Continental Airlines 200092 TCQ Express.Net Airlines 2002-2006
93 TNQ Emery Worldwide Airlines 1995-2001
TW Trans World Airways LLC 200194 TW Trans World Airlines Inc. 1995-2000
TZ American Trans Air Inc. 1995-200295 TZ ATA Airlines d/b/a ATA 2003-2008
96 U2 UFS Inc. 1995-2000
97 U5 USA 3000 Airlines 2003-2012
98 U7 USA Jet Airlines Inc. 1998-2013
99 UA United Air Lines Inc. 1995-2013
US USAir 1995-1996100 US US Airways Inc. 1997-2013
101 VX Virgin America 2008-2013
102 W7 Western Pacific Airlines 1996-1998
103 WE Centurion Cargo Inc. 2007, 2009
104 WN Southwest Airlines Co. 1995-2013
105 WO World Airways Inc. 1996, 2000-2013
106 WP Island Air Hawaii 2013
107 X9 Omni Air Express 2000-2013
108 XJ Mesaba Airlines 1998-2008, 2011
109 XP Casino Express 2002-2013
110 YV Mesa Airlines Inc. 1996-1997, 2004-2013
111 YX Republic Airlines 2006-2013
YX (1) Midwest Express Airlines 1996-2002112 YX (1) Midwest Airline, Inc. 2003-2009
113 ZKQ Zantop International 2002-2003
114 ZW Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp 1995-2013
 We examine the effect of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.
 The data is an unbalanced panel data of US carriers from 1995 to 2013.
 We use a simultaneous quantile regression method.
 The long-run fuel price elasticity varies depending on consumption quantiles.
 A tax increase has a larger impact on smaller carriers than on larger carriers.
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